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We have inorganically increased the use of web applications to the point of using
them for almost everything and making them an essential part of our everyday lives. As a
result, the enhancement of privacy and security policies for the web applications is
becoming increasingly essential. The importance and stateless nature of the web
infrastructure made the web a preferred target of attacks. The current web access control
system is a reason behind the victory of attacks. The current web consists of two major
components, the browser and the server, where the effective access control system needs
to be implemented. In terms of an access control system, the current web has adopted the
inadequate same origin policy and same session policy for the browser and server,
respectively. The current web access control system policies are sufficient for the earlier
day‟s web, which became inadequate to address the protection needs of today‟s web.
In order to protect the web application from un-trusted contents, we provide an
enhanced browser based access control system by enabling the dynamic scoping. Our
security model for the browser will allow the client and trusted web application contents
to share a common library and protect web contents from each other, while they still get
executed at different trust levels. We have implemented a working model of an enhanced
browser based access control system in Java, under the Lobo browser.
vii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Internet is a global system of interconnected computer networks that uses the
standard Internet protocol suite to serve billions of users worldwide [29]. It allows us to
provide easy and efficient communication between any place in the world, work from
remote locations, locate and retrieve the useful information within seconds, and access
services and entertainment via World Wide Web (Web). It is a very common mistake for
most people to treat the terms “Internet” and „World Wide Web” as interchangeable. The
words “Internet” and “World Wide Web” are not the same thing but related things. The
Internet is a global network of networks. In contrast, the Web is one of the applications
that run on the Internet. For example, the Internet is a restaurant and the Web is the most
popular dish on the menu.
The volume of traffic moving over the Internet, as well as corporate networks, is
expanding exponentially every day. It is estimated that there are over 2.26 billion people
worldwide with Internet access as of December 31, 2011 [1]. While communication
companies contend frantically to bring faster transmissions into homes, and with the
Internet evolving to deliver new forms of services and entertainment, many experts
predict that the best is yet to come.
The Web has a tremendous impact on our personal lives, through which large
volumes of personal and business communications are taking place. It has now evolved to
account for large portions of corporate revenue. There was tremendous progress in its
development since the Web was invented. The current Web is no longer a platform for
1

simple static pages; it has evolved to highly dynamic and interactive ones. The Web is
indispensable in education, security, modern commerce, entertainment, and social
interaction. It became a complex delivery platform for sophisticated, distributed
applications with multifaceted security requirements. Analysts are constantly trying to
find out the number of web pages available on the Web. However, it is quite impossible
to analyze. Even by the time they are analyzed, the final number of pages would have
increased by many thousands, since thousands of pages pour in every minute. Google
claims to have indexed over a trillion pages as of July 25, 2008 [2]. As of February 27,
2012, over 139.2 million websites are hosting these web pages [3].
1.1 Nature of the web
The Web is stateless by nature. Stateless protocol is a communication protocol in
computing, which treats each request as an independent request, even if two requests are
related to each other. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [5] is the best example of the
stateless protocol [4]. Web servers are designed to be stateless [28] in nature which uses
the HTTP for the data communication. It treats or processes each HTTP request by an
independent process, even if two requests are related to each other. These servers do not
store any user data during processing the HTTP request. This is in contrast with the
traditional File Transfer Protocol (FTP) [6] servers, which are stateful. In traditional
client/server applications, a process will be assigned for each client, until the client
terminates. All the requests generated by the client are processed by a single process
respectively. These servers will store the client‟s details during processing each request.
The main cause for the Web‟s stateless nature is performance. The web servers needed to
2

address the large number of clients than traditional client/server applications, so they do
not want any process to be tied up with a single client.
Shopping cart is one of the most common web applications, which requires the
application to keep track of the items in the cart during the traverses from one page to
another. This makes most of the web applications to be stateful. The web servers support
these applications by using session concept. For example, for the Amazon shopping cart
application, when the web server notices a new user browsing, it assigns a session ID to
the user which will be stored in the browser cookie. This cookie will be sent along with
each HTTP request so that the server indentifies the request session. This is how a
stateless web server will support a stateful application.
Building stateful applications on the stateless web infrastructure has raised many
security problems [7]. Furthermore complicating matters, the Web continues to evolve
with new browser features, protocols and standards added at rapid pace. The
specifications of new features are often complex, lack of security models and the security
of the applications is overlooked. As a result, large numbers of vulnerabilities and
security threats are raised for the web applications.
1.2 Contents of the web
Web had been designed for serving static contents; initially, this originated from a
single trusted source. It has now evolved into quite dynamic contents and requests
derived from multiple sources with varying levels of trustworthiness. Contents may be
included by the Web itself, derived from user supplied text or from partially third parties.
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Web contents are divided into three types based on the varying levels of trustworthiness
[7].
1.2.1 Trusted contents
The contents which are originated from the web application itself are considered
as trusted contents. Trustworthiness of these contents depends on the nature of the
application and the procedure followed by the application developer. For example, to
update status, to write on a wall, to ask a question, to add photos or videos and confirm
friend requests on Facebook, all of these are the trusted contents which are generated and
maintained by the Facebook application.
1.2.2 Untrusted contents
Many web applications now include the user provided contents such as blogs,
comments, feedback, user profiles, etc., in their pages. These contents are the third-party
data and less trustworthy than the first-party contents generated by the web application
itself. For example, untrusted contents include advertisements and fake profiles in social
networks like Facebook and Orkut. The current web, due to its stateless nature, cannot
restrict in assigning access privileges to the contents based on their trustworthiness.
1.2.3 Partially trusted contents
Many web applications allow extensions to their pages i.e., they include the links
to third-party programs or directly include third-party programs in their pages and run
those programs in the browser. For example, third-party applications like CastleVille are
embedded in a user‟s Facebook page, which will collect information from a user‟s
4

account and run on the third-party application servers. These contents can be dangerous if
they are vulnerable or malicious.

Figure 1: Example for different types of web contents
Figure 1 shows the Facebook application with different types of web contents. If
these contents are not carefully handled, malicious code can be injected into the web
application. However, Facebook has its own mechanism to handle these contents without
any security issues.
1.3 Attacks on web
The Web, due to its importance and stateless nature has become a preferred target
of attacks. Web attacks are apparently more serious when they are inflicted upon
businesses that store sensitive data, such as personal, military, confidential, medical,
governmental, and financial records. The consequences of attacks on any entity range
from mildly inconvenient to completely debilitating. According to the Norton
5

Cybercrime Report 2011 [8], the total cost of cybercrime is at $388 billion per year,
which includes $114 billion in direct theft and time spent resolving attacks, plus another
$274 billion for productive time victims lost due to cybercrimes being committed against
them.
The top ten web attacks according to the OWSAP Top 10, 2007 [9] are
1. Cross Site Scripting (XSS).
2. Injection Flaws.
3. Malicious File Execution.
4. Insecure Direct Object Reference.
5. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF).
6. Information Leakage and Improper Error Handling.
7. Broken Authentication and Session Management.
8. Insecure Cryptographic Storage.
9. Insecure Communications.
10. Failure to Restrict URL Access.
Most of the Web vulnerabilities appear to be caused by the mistakes made during
the design and development of the application by the developer. However, when we take
a deep look at the architecture and functionalities of the Web, we come to the conclusion
that the main cause for web vulnerabilities is the access control system of the Web, not
the developer.

6

1.3.1 Access control system
Access control system refers to a security enforcement model that has the ability
to decide who can do what to whom in a system. Access control system consists of three
components: principals, objects and the access control model. Principals (who) are the
entities in the system that can manipulate resources. Objects (whom) are the resources in
the system that require controlled access. The access control model tells how decisions
are made in the system. For example, consider an online exam application for school.
Alice is a professor who teaches CS600 and wants to conduct an online exam for
students. To avoid plagiarism, she designed an exam pattern in such a way that each
student will get his or her own exam paper based on their ID numbers i.e., Bob with ID
number 1 will get paper set 1 and John with ID number 21 gets paper set 21. Here the
access control system comes into play, which decides who can do what to whom in a
system. When the students login to the application with their ID numbers, the access
control system first checks their ID numbers, and then assigns the exam paper to each
student respectively.
1.3.2 Web components
The current web consists of two major components, the browser and the server,
where the effective access control system needs to be implemented. In terms of access
control system, the current web has adopted the inadequate same origin policy (SOP) and
same session policy (SSP) for the browser and server respectively. This was sufficient for
the earlier day‟s web, which became inadequate to address the protection needs of
today‟s web. Web applications that embed third party content in their web pages cannot
7

restrict the permissions of the third party code due to the failures of the access control
system. In order to overcome this fundamental problem, we have developed an enhanced
browser based access control system by enabling dynamic scoping. The objective of our
work is to make the access control system address the current web content problems,
which will allow the client and trusted web application contents to share the common
library and protect web contents from each other, while they still get executed at different
trust levels.

8

CHAPTER 2: THE PURPOSE FOR PROTECTION ENHANCEMENT
This chapter describes the drawbacks of the current access control system and
need of its enhancement. The access control system has been implemented on web
components, browsers and servers, by adopting the same origin policy (SOP) and the
same session policy (SSP) respectively.
2.1 Same origin policy
The same origin policy (SOP) is also called single origin policy. SOP prevents
documents or scripts loaded from one origin from getting or setting properties of a
document from a different origin. It also allows scripts running on pages originating from
the same site to access each other‟s methods and properties with no specific restrictions
[10]. The term “origin” is defined as a combination of the domain name, protocol and
port number of the HTML document. Two documents or scripts are considered to be of
the same origin if and only if all these values are exactly the same. For instance,
http://www.abc.com/jobs.html and http://www.abc.com/price.html belong to the same
origin, but http://www.xyz.com/jobs.html and http://www.abc.com/jobs.html don‟t
belong to the same origin as they had different domains. Similarly,
http://www.abc.com/jobs.html and https://www.abc.com/price.html don‟t belong to the
same origin as they had different protocols.
The following example will illustrate the importance of the same origin policy of
a browser. Assume that you are logged into Facebook and visit a malicious website in
another browser tab. Without the same origin policy, JavaScript on a malicious website

9

could do anything to your Facebook account. For example, the hacker could read private
messages, post status updates, and change security questions. In Figure 2, www.abc.com
can access the contents of the www.facebook.com the user page.
In order to avoid this illegal access to Facebook, it is important for the browser to
detect trusted and untrusted Java Scripts to access Facebook resources. That's where the
same origin policy comes into play. If the JavaScript is included in Facebook HTML
page, it may access facebook.com resources; otherwise it cannot access facebook.com
resources.

Figure 2: Without same origin policy
In Figure 3 www.abc.com cannot access the contents of the www.facebook.com
user page due to the same origin policy. Privileges should be assigned to contents based
on the trustworthiness even if they belong to the same origin and this is indispensable in
the current web. Cross Site Scripting (XXS) [11] is one of the side effects of the same
origin policy
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Figure 3: With same origin policy
2.1.1 Cross Site Scripting (XXS)
Cross Site Scripting attack is an injection type of attack that takes advantage of
website vulnerability in which the site displays content that includes un-sanitized userprovided data. XSS allows the user to inject a malicious code into trusted websites, which
provides attackers a way to bypass client-side security mechanisms (i.e., same origin
policy) normally imposed on the web content by modern web browsers. On the
successful injection of the code, the attacker can gain elevated access privileges to the
entire page based on the same origin policy, i.e., scripts running on pages originating
from the same site are allowed to access each other‟s methods and properties without
considering trustworthiness of contents.
For instance, a victim website which allows users to create communities with
their own rules, ranks, chat boards and polls. These communities may be designed with
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images, graphics, animations and text to make their community look better and more fit
the theme. For example, a community that protests against a war might be designed with
pictures of recent wars and their consequences. The attacker can inject a malicious code
in to the victim website while creating the user communities. As a malicious code
originating from the same site, it has access to other scripts or contents in the page based
on the same origin policy.
On successful injection of a malicious code and browsing of attackers
communities by users, the attacker can take control of user accounts and either use a
malicious code to automatically manipulate the user accounts, such as forcing the user to
post comments or join the community whether they want to or not, or stealing the credit
card and private information. This could also be used to redirect the user to websites that
places virii, spyware, adware, or other malicious content on computer.

Figure 4: Illustrate XSS Attack
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The cause of this attack is due to the inadequacy of current same origin policy
which cannot provide the security based on the trustworthiness of current web page
contents. Figure 4 will illustrate the sequence of actions performed by XSS attack.
2.2 Same session policy
Similarly, on the server side access control is primarily based on the same session
policy. When a user logs into a web application, the server creates a dedicated session for
this user, separating him or her from the other users. Sessions are implemented using
session cookies; as long as a request carries a session cookie, it will be given all the
privileges associated with that session. Namely within each session, all requests are given
the same privileges, regardless of whether they are initiated by first-party or third-party
contents. In the current access control system, it is difficult to allow the request from the
same web page to access the same session, while preventing some of them from invoking
certain server-side services [12]. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [13] is one of the
side effects of the same session policy.
2.2.1 Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Cross Site Request Forgery is also known as the one-click attack, sea surf attack
or confused deputy attack. CSRF is a type of attack on a website in which an intruder
masquerades as a legitimate and trusted user. A CSRF attack can be executed by stealing
the identity of an existing user and then hacking into a web server using that identity. An
attacker can masquerade as a legitimate user by sending HTTP requests that return
sensitive user data to the intruder. CSRF exploits the trust that a site has in a user's
13

browser where as XSS exploits the trust a user has for a particular site [14]. CSRF uses
the vulnerabilities in same session policy to perform an attack successfully, i.e., requests
or actions which are originating from the same session will be given the same privileges
regardless of whether they are originated from first party or third party contents.

Figure 5: Illustrate CSRF Attack
A real world example of this is the ability of attackers to commandeer certain
banking websites. The required steps to gain ownership and perform fraudulent financial
transaction are shown in the following example:
1. Once a user logs into an online banking account, the banking server
assigns a session to the user.
2. Before the session expires or the user logs off from the banking
account, he or she surfs the internet by opening a new tab in the
browser.
3.

The website surfed by the user contains a hidden code. User browsing
activates the code and sends a HTML request to the bank web server
with authentication details from browser cookies.
14

4. So the attacker can make fraudulent transaction to his or her account.
This attack will be successful only when the request is made from a session.
Figure 5 will illustrate the sequence of actions performed by a CSRF attack.
2.3 Failure to support design principles
Both the same origin policy and the same session policy failed to fulfill the
fundamentals proposed by Saltzer and Schroeder [15] in “The Protection of Information
in Computer Systems”. Separation of privilege and least privilege are the two of eight
design principles summarized by Saltzer and Schroeder, which are violated by the current
web access control system polices. In order to provide efficient security on the Web, the
following two principles must be supported by current web access control system.
2.3.1 Separation of privilege
According to the principle of a separation of privilege, privileges in a system
should be divided into less powerful privileges, such that no single accident or breach of
trust is sufficient to compromise the protected information. For instance, this principle is
most commonly used in the banking system for bank safety deposit boxes, where two
physical keys are needed to lock and unlock the boxes. Once the box is locked, two keys
are separated and maintained, one by a user and another by the bank manager to avoid
unauthorized access due to loss of keys.

15

2.3.2 Least privilege
According to the principle of least privilege, each user in the system should be
least privileged to complete their jobs without any interruption based on their
trustworthiness. For instance, in UNIX the normal user should not be given the privileges
of a root user unless they are required for its legitimate purpose.
The current web access control systems are inadequate to address the protection
needs of today‟s web because it is violating the above mentioned design principles. So
there is need for redesigning the access control system of the Web to provide efficient
security. We have enhanced the access control system of the Web by enabling the
dynamic scoping for the browser, which overcomes the inadequacies in the same origin
and the same session policies and also provides support for the Saltzer and Schroeder
design principles.

16

CHAPTER 3: RELATED WORK
The need for enhancing the fine-grained access control system for the Web has
been recognized earlier by many researchers. A number of approaches are proposed by
researchers in two ways: either to modify the browser or rewrite the entire script, which
can be done either statically or dynamically.
By using the iframe [16], we can easily isolate the third-party contents or script by
putting them in the iframe from the host page. Scripts included in the iframe will be
considered as originating from the different origin, so those scripts cannot access any
script or contents in the host domain. This will have a severe effect on the web
application‟s functionality. To avoid this all-or-nothing model, several solutions were
proposed for a browser-based access control system.
Crites et al.‟s proposed Mashup solutions [24]. Mashup solutions brought a policy
that abandons the same origin policy by allowing the integrator to specify public and
private data including DOM access. Completely abandoning the SOP would require a
significant change to websites. This is going to be expensive work.
To avoid completely abandoning the SOP, Miller proposed a Caja method [25].
This approach is based on a concept of rewriting the program source code to enforce the
security policies. The rewriting procedure of Caja is very complicated and cannot always
preserve original script functionality.
In contrast to Caja, Barth et al.‟s isolated world mechanism [23] replaces the oneto-one context mapping with a one-to-many map where each context maintains a
17

mapping table to the DOM elements of the host page. This ensures that only host objects
are shared among all worlds but not native or custom objects. We have adopted this
isolated world mechanism idea to isolate the contents‟ execution.
Zhou and Evans proposed a solution [26] in extension to isolated world
mechanism. It is a one-way trust model with a goal to protect user content from untrusted
scripts rather than to protect embedded scripts from the host page or each other. This
approach doesn‟t consider the JavaScript frameworks like jQuery and other attacks like
cross site scripting, which are very important to provide the security to web applications.
This fine-grained access control system aims to protect the trusted content from the
untrusted content, but not to protect the contents from each other.
Du et al.‟s proposed SCUTA [12]. It is based on the ESCUDO [27], which was
their earlier work in protecting privacy for web applications. SCUTA uses the new
concept called sub-session for web applications, which is based on the ring concept in the
ESCUDO, so the requests from trusted client-side contents can be separated from those
of untrusted contents; such a separation enables web applications to enforce a finegrained access control system. This approach provides security measures against various
attacks like cross site scripting, which are not addressed in the Zhou and Evans approach.
In both solutions, the JavaScript code in different worlds or rings will not interact
with each other. In a real world application, especially in many social networking sites, it
would be ideal that the hosting applications have the capability to provide a shared
library, which can be used by third party users. Based on this observation, we propose to
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use the origin of the function call, instead of the location of the function, to decide the
privileges of the JavaScript code.
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CHAPTER 4:TWO-WAY SECURITY MODEL
The objective of our work is to make the access control system address the current
web content problems. The proposed approach will allow the client and trusted web
application contents to share the common library and protect web contents from each
other by executing at different trust levels. We assume a two-way security model since
our goal is to protect web contents from each other and allow sharing the common library
among the web contents.
We need to make fundamental changes to the current web protection model to
address the protection needs of modern applications. The two-way security model can be
obtained by enabling dynamic scoping for the current web access control system. The
two-way security model doesn‟t target in changing the today‟s web architecture but
focuses on fundamental changes to the access control system.
Our model doesn‟t make any changes to the basic policies of current access
control system but enhances it with dynamic scoping, i.e., our model will use the existing
same origin and same session policies without any changes. Our model allows the
developer to configure their application by appropriately specifying the shared library
and other contents with their trustworthiness. Web applications communicate the
conﬁguration to the web browser, where the proposed access control model enforces
access decisions based on the conﬁguration. Figure 6 will illustrate our two-way security
model.
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1. Let us consider Group 1 and Group 2 are the client and trusted contents, and the
shared library is a collection of some trusted contents.
2. The application developer specifies the shared library and other contents with
their trustworthiness to the browser.
3. Group 1 and Group 2 can access (read-only access) shared library but cannot
manipulate it, i.e., Group 1 and Group 2 can get the resources from the shared
library and use them, but cannot make any changes to the shared library. This
proposal is based on a very simple principle: If one would like to manipulate his
own work, it is allowed to proceed; if one would like to manipulate something
outside his work, the actions will be prohibited.
4. Group 1 and Group 2 cannot access each other.

Figure 6: Two-way security model
21

In modern web applications, different web contents are needed to access each
other to perform their task successfully. The complete isolation of contents will not fit for
modern web applications, so there is a need for the web applications to share some
common things among the web contents irrespective of trustworthiness. To avoid the
burden and complexities in defining relationships among the web contents and protecting
them from each other, our model defines the shared library and allows web contents to
access them. To differentiate and designate the trustworthiness of different components in
a web application, we introduce the group concept for different components in a web
page. This concept is very similar to the ring concept in SCUTA. The key difference is
that the defining access control is based on where the JavaScript code is initiated, not
where the code is located.
Our two-way security model places all the web contents in different groups based
on their trustworthiness except the shared library. Shared library contents are placed in
the default group. Our model allows web developers to choose the total number of groups
that fit their application needs. The number of groups for one application is independent
from others.
This two-way security model can be achieved by enforcing dynamic scoping for
web based access control system. In computer programming, scope is the range within a
computer program in which a variable name or other identifier is valid and can be used,
or within which a declaration has effect. Computer programming has two different types
of scoping: they are static and dynamic scoping.
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Static scope is determined at compile time by the compiler using a sequential
processing of program and remains the same throughout the program. Static scoping
determines the occurrence of an identifier by first checking the local block in which the
name appears, then the block construct that declares the block (i.e., its static parent). This
process is repeated until a definition is found. That is, the compiler first searches
(searching for variable or identifier) in the local function (the function which is running
now), then searches in the function in which that function was defined, then searches in
the function in which that function was defined, and so forth until a definition is found.
By default C, C++ and JavaScript uses static scoping.
In contrast, dynamic scoping is determined at runtime. In dynamic scoping,
processing of program statements follows the execution order of different statements and
can change during the execution of the program. Dynamic scoping determines the
definition for an occurrence of the identifier or a variable by examining the calling
sequence, rather than the program block declaration hierarchy as in static scoping. That
is, the search for identifier starts first in local function, then search in the function
that called the local function, then search in the function that called that function, and so
on, up the call stack until the definition is found. "Dynamic" refers to change, in that the
call stack can be different every time a given function is called, and so the function might
hit different variables depending on where it is called from. Figure 7 will illustrate the
difference between the static and dynamic scoping.
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Figure 7: Difference between static and dynamic scoping.
1. Bob‟s function returns the 15 by fetching value from its lexically
enclosing scope i.e. a=10, when it is called directly. The Function Alice()
which calls Bob(), returns different values in static and dynamic scoping.
2. In static scoping the function, Alice () calls Bob (), which fetches the
variable “a” value from its lexically enclosing scope i.e., a=10 and
returns 15.
3. In dynamic scoping the function, Alice () calls Bob (), which fetches the
variable “a” value from the initiated function i.e., a=20 and returns 25.
Execution of JavaScript requires a scope for top-level script variable storage as
well as a place to find standard objects like function and object. Calls to functions in
JavaScript use static scope, which means that variables are first looked up in the function
and then, if not found there, in the lexically enclosing scope. This causes problems if
24

functions you define in your shared library need access to variables you define in your
instance scope as illustrated in Figure 7. For better understanding of how scoping affects
functionalities of shared library consider Bob() as shared library function and Alice() as
initiated function in Figure 7. Therefore our two-way security model can be achieved
only by enforcing dynamic scoping for web based access control system.
In order to get better understanding of our two-way security model, we use the
more complete example shown in Figure 8 to demonstrate working of our model. In this
example, shared library contains variables a=6, b=9, and functions product(), and reset().
The product() function calculates and returns the product of two numbers. The reset()
function will manipulate the contents of documents such as making the document empty
or setting different values to the variables. The remaining scripts are grouped into group1
and group2 according to their trustworthiness.
Group1 contains the variables a=1, b=2, and a call to the product() function in the
shared library. The product() function initiated from group1 will fetch values of the
variables a and b from the group1, and returns 2 rather than 54.
Group2 contains the variables a=1, b=2, and a call to the reset() and product()
functions in the shared library. The product() function initiated from group2 will fetch
values of the variables a and b from the group1 and returns 2 rather than 54. When the
dynamic scoping is used, DOM root is the root of scripts scope that initiates the function
rather than the scripts which contain the function. The reset() function initiated from
group2, will manipulate the contents of group2 only, not the shared library as the
document root is the root of group2 rather than the root of the shared library.
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Figure 8: Complete example demonstrates working of a two-way security model
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CHAPTER 5: EFFECTUATION OF TWO-WAY SECURITY MODEL
This chapter describes a prototype implementation of the two-way security model
on the Lobo browser [17] based on the requirements and design presented in Chapter 4.
The Lobo open source project aims to develop an extensible browser and RIA platform
written completely in Java that not only supports HTML and JavaScript, but also enables
rendering of arbitrary Rich Internet Application (RIA) languages [18]. The Lobo browser
is built on the Cobra HTML Rendering engine, which is a pure Java HTML renderer and
DOM parser that is being developed to support HTML 4, JavaScript and CSS 2. Cobra
uses the Rhino 1.6R5 JavaScript engine, which is released by the Mozilla Foundation
[19].
5.1 Lobo Architecture
The architecture of the Lobo browser which we derived is shown in Figure 9
[20]. Lobo is intended to be a platform for building new client-side web languages.
Therefore, the browser architecture is designed to be easily extensible. It comprises
five major subsystems plus the dependencies between them.
5.1.1 User Interface
The User Interface subsystem is the layer between the user and the browser
engine. It provides features such as toolbars, page services, navigation, preferences,
and printing. It may be integrated with the desktop environment to provide browser
session management or communication with other desktop applications.
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Figure 9: Architecture of Lobo browser
5.1.2 Browser Engine
The Browser Engine subsystem is an embeddable component that provides a
high-level interface to the rendering engine. It consists of three important
components: the Request Engine, Extensions Manager, and Cache Manager. User
requests are forwarded to the servers by the Request Engine from the user
interface. The Request Engine uses the Extensions Manager to choose an
appropriate extension to render the response. The Extensions Manager uses the
Cobra HTML Rendering Engine for rendering web pages. The Cache Manager is
responsible for caching r esp ons e s based on the instructions specified in the
HTTP cache-control header. The Request Engine interacts or contacts with the
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Cache Manager before issuing a network request, and serves the response from
the cache if possible.
5.1.3 Cobra HTML Rendering Engine
The Cobra HTML Rendering Engine subsystem is a pure Java HTML
renderer and DOM parser that produces a visual representation for a given URL. It is
capable of displaying HTML and Extensible Markup Language documents, styled
with CSS, as well as embedded content such as images. It consists of five major
components, which are HTML parser, Layout or Graphics Engine, Document Object
Model (DOM), Window and XMLHttpRequest objects. Cobra uses the HTML
parser, which can be used independently of the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine to
parse the web page to page and construct a DOM tree corresponding to the page.
Each web page is assigned a distinct DOM and a Window, which is an abstraction of
the window in which the web page is displayed. The XMLHttpRequest object is used
by JavaScript programs to send HTTP requests. The Layout or Graphics Engine is
used to render the graphic contents of web pages.
5.1.4 Rhino JavaScript Interpreter
Cobra uses the Rhino 1.6R5 JavaScript engine, which is released by the Mozilla
Foundation [19]. Rhino JavaScript interpreter executes JavaScript code, which may be
embedded in web pages. Rhino doesn‟t contain any objects or methods for manipulating
HTML documents but it is only an implementation of core language [21].
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Rhino includes the following features [21]
1. All the features of JavaScript 1.5
2. Allows direct scripting of Java
3. A JavaScript shell for executing JavaScript scripts
4. A JavaScript compiler to transform JavaScript source files into
Java class files.
5.1.5 Object Wrapper
The Rhino JavaScript Interpreter accesses the DOM, Window, and
XMLHttpRequest objects via the Object Wrapper. All the requests to the three objects are
mediated through Object Wrapper.
5.2 Identifying subsystems of the Lobo browser architecture for
implementation
This section describes the identification of the subsystems of Lobo browser
architecture to make modification for enforcement of two-way security model. JavaScript
is a dynamic scripting language, which is one of the sources for the attackers to violate
the security policies of web page. In Lobo browser, JavaScript is parsed by HTML parser
and executed by the Rhino JavaScript engine. Rhino was completely written in Java and
enforces its own security policies. It is very important to understand the terms context
and scopes in Rhino.
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The Rhino context object is used to store thread-specific information about the
execution environment [22]. A thread executing JavaScript should be associated with
only one context.
Execution of JavaScript requires a scope to find a place where it can access and
store the variables or objects. In Rhino it is important to understand that scope is
independent of context that created it, i.e., creating a scope for JavaScript can be done
using one context and executing the script using that scope and different context is
allowed.
Rhino follows the same origin policy, which assigns the privileges based on the
origin. Rhino provides the ability to keep track of the origin of a code in webpage. Rhino
provides a security-channel to enforce its security features in web application. The
security channel needs to do two things.
First, every context that is created must be supplied an instance of an object that
implements the SecuritySupport interface. This will provide Rhino the support
functionality it needs to perform security-related tasks [21].
Second, the value of the property security.requireSecurityDomain should be
changed to true in the resource bundle org.mozila.javascript.resources.Security. The
value of this property can be determined at runtime by calling the
isSecurityDomainRequired method of context. Setting this property to true requires that
any calls that compile or evaluate JavaScript must supply a security domain object of any
object type that will be used to identify JavaScript code [21].
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The security-channel provided by Rhino will be sufficient for overcoming the
current web access control drawbacks; by implementing our two-way security model
without any modifications to the current security policy of Rhino. We need to make
modification to the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine subsystem rather than the Rhino
engine security features to implement the two-way security model.
5.3 Two-way security model implementation
This section describes a prototype implementation of a two-way security model
on the Lobo browser. Our two-way security model implementation was involved in
adding or modifying approximately 900 lines of code to the Cobra HTML Rendering
Engine. We did not make any modification to the Rhino JavaScript engine security
features. Hence, our implementation can be used with any pure Java based web browser
that uses the Rhino JavaScript engine. Our implementation involved two phases:
1. Extracting and Tracking security groups.
2. Enforcing access control policy.
5.3.1 Extracting and Tracking security groups
This phase deals with the Extracting and Tracking security groups of two-way
security model. Whenever web application or page is called from Lobo web browser,
Cobra HTML Rendering Engine parser parses the web page and constructs the DOM
objects. We have modified the Lobo browser to recognize a new attribute group in script
tags. During this process our two-way security model extracts the security group from
script tags and stores it in the DOM elements for the respective HTML tags. If a group
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element is not found in the script tags our model assigns a default group to that content.
The contents with a default group are categorized as shared contents. It is the
responsibility of the developer to configure their application with different security
groups.
Two-way security model tracks the security groups during the execution of
scripts. It maintains a webpage-specific table, which is used for maintaining security
groups of current executing web contents. Our model dynamically updates the table
according to the flow of execution. Our model does not make any changes to the order of
parsing and execution of the web contents. Normally, the parsing and execution of the
web contents will be done in the order of their appearance and dependencies on the web
page. The common processing work of the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine parser is
creating DOM elements and adding them to the DOM tree. Some web contents can
momentarily create HTTP request for accessing other web contents during the processing
work of the Cobra HTML Rendering Engine. Before answering those requests, our model
retrieves the security group of HTTP requests content origin from the DOM and updates
the web-page specific table and then answers the request. As a result the new requests
generated dynamically can still execute in the origin context.
5.3.2 Enforcing access control policy
Two-way security model enforces the access control policy based on principle
that the contents of web application share the common library and protect from each
other, while they still get executed at different trust levels. Two-way security model
enforcement comprises three parts.
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First, our model isolates all the web contents based on their group values. In order
to isolate the web contents we adopted the isolated world mechanism idea from Adam
Barth‟s Protecting Browsers from Extensions Vulnerabilities [23]. The isolated world
mechanism replaces the one-to-one context mapping with a one-to-many map where each
context maintains mapping table to the DOM elements of the host page. This ensures that
only host objects are shared among all worlds, but not native or custom objects.
We adopted and modified this mechanism to implement the two-way security
model. Our model creates a separate context for each group. Each time the Rhino
JavaScript engine is invoked by the Cobra HTML parse to execute JavaScript program, it
passes the JavaScript context corresponding to the programs group. As a result,
JavaScript programs belonging to a group can access only the custom and native objects
that reside in the context belonging to the group. This isolation is necessary to protect the
web contents from each other.
Second, our model supports the dynamic scoping and scripting as we are
enforcing access control policies at runtime. As our model creates separate context for
each scripts, the dynamically generated scripts will run in different context from the
scripts that created them. This will break the functionality since variables and functions
that should be shared are now isolated. We made modifications to the Lobo Browser in
such a way that dynamically generated scripts will inherit the group from their creator,
thus executing within the same context.
Third, our model supports the library sharing by modifying the prototype chain of
scope and restricting any modification to the shared library by using sealObject() method.
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Our model enables the sharing of contents by creating a new context and calling scope
object by setting its setprototype method to sharedscope object and parent to null. Our
model restricts others making changes to shared library by calling the sealObject method.
sealObject method will not allow to add or delete properties to the object and make
changes to the existing objects. Our model assigns the default group to the contents that
don‟t carry the group element in the script tags. The content with default group is
categorized as shared library. It is the responsibility of the developer to specify the type
of content by configuring the web applications.
We have implemented two phases of the two-way security model without any
compatibility issues.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
We strongly believe that the access control system in the current web is
inadequate to satisfy the protection needs of today‟s web. The web technology is still
evolving, so a good access control system design should not only be able to satisfy
today‟s needs, it should also be extensible to satisfy the unknown protection needs that
will inevitably come up during the technology evolution. So we outlined the two
characteristics that a security model of the access control system should adapt, to address
the current web problems and provide support to the security model evolution that
address the future web problems. We have presented a browser based access control by
enabling the dynamic scoping. This access control model is systematically designed to
fulfill the two characteristic requirements using mandatory access-control principles. We
implemented a prototype of a new browser based access control in the Lobo web browser
and illustrated how web applications can use this new access control system.
Future research in browser access control should consider how to facilitate richer
web applications while enforcing the principle of least privilege. In the future, web
applications will feature richer and more interactive clients executing in the web browser.
So the future research should focus on architecture improvements of the Web and design
of API methods, to facilitate JavaScript programs to enforce the least privilege principle
of the access control in the richer applications.
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